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FINANCIAL SHOCKS AND BUSINESS CYCLES:
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Both history and contemporary experience are replete with episodes
of ﬁnancial crisis leading to major output contractions. Predecessors of
the current Asian crisis can be found in the interwar period as well as
under the pre-World War I gold standard, although U.S. experience
post-World War II is free so far of a recession initiated by widespread
credit-institution problems. In 1890, the Barings crisis not only threw
Argentina into turmoil, but also spilled over to “emerging markets” as
distant as Australia and Turkey. In the United States, ﬁnancial panics
leading to recession were a regular occurrence before 1914. And, of
course, even after: In 1931, twin banking and currency crises in central
Europe spread to the United States, to other industrial economies, and to
developing countries, hammering real activity and provoking a wave of
international debt defaults. The developing-country debt crisis of the
1980s led to a near-decade of lost growth in Latin America and elsewhere,
while the 1994-95 Mexican peso crisis led to a short, sharp contraction
there and to contagion effects elsewhere, notably in Argentina.
Indeed, it is fair to say that for developing economies, exogenous
ﬂuctuations in capital ﬂows have once again become a dominant business
cycle shock. They remain a potential problem in developed economies as
well, although lessons learned in the Great Depression and the resulting
institutional reforms have greatly blunted the threat.
*Class of 1958 Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. The author
thanks Jay Shambaugh for assistance, and the National Science Foundation for research
support.CAPITAL FLOWS AND INSTABILITY OF EXPECTATIONS
It is well accepted that credit markets can have multiple equilibria, so
that exogenous shifts in expectations—“sunspots” if you will—can play
a role, potentially an important role, in generating cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) formalized the point that an illiquid credit
institution could be viable if depositors had conﬁdence in the value of its
short-term obligations, but would fail if depositors coordinated instead
on an equilibrium in which all attempted to withdraw their funds. Of
course, long experience had strongly suggested the possibility as well!
In a purely domestic context, public policy has sought to limit such
expectational instability through partial deposit insurance, lender of last
resort support, accounting standards, capitalization requirements, and
direct prudential supervision and regulation. The latter three ingredients
serve to limit the moral hazard—on the part of depositors as well as
deposit takers—that ofﬁcial guarantees induce. Even in developed coun-
tries, however, such safeguards have failed to stop ﬁnancial malfeasance
and failure—witness the costly U. S. savings and loan collapse. Nor have
they always prevented contagious ﬁnancial crises. The current predica-
ment of Japan, whose economy shrank at an annual rate above 5 percent
in the ﬁrst quarter of this year, stems from a number of factors, all of
which have been greatly ampliﬁed by widespread corruption and a weak
ﬁnancial system that has never recovered from the collapse of the
late-1980s Japanese “bubble” economy.
Financial crises can bring into question the credit of entire countries
as well, and here too there can be an element of self-fulﬁlling prophecy,
as in a bank run. In this case, pure investor panic becomes an important
driving force for the economy. In East Asia, the effects of recent crises
have been dramatic. Countries in the region have moved rather abruptly
from very rapid positive to negative growth rates. First quarter 1998 GDP
was 1.8 percent below its level a year earlier in Malaysia, 3.8 percent
below in South Korea, 6.2 percent below in Indonesia, and 2 percent
below in Hong Kong (The Economist, July 18th-24th, 1998, p. 92).
The possibility of national ﬁnancial collapse, sparked by a reversal of
capital inﬂows, is inherently harder to contain than the problem of
domestic ﬁnancial stability. In the international setting, gaps and asym-
metries in prudential regulation make evasion comparatively easy. For-
mal deposit insurance does not apply, accounting standards differ across
countries, there is no clearly deﬁned lender of last resort nor any
universally accepted legal procedure for working out insolvency prob-
lems. (International cooperation to plug some of these holes has been on
the docket of the Basle Committee of international bank regulators since
the 1970s.) In addition, exchange-rate risk adds another big potential
source of illiquidity or even insolvency.
In thinking about problems due to capital ﬂow instability, it is useful
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exchange-rate or currency crises, and national solvency crises. The
separation is artiﬁcial, in that the two types of crisis may occur simulta-
neously and interact, but I wish to consider them separately for the
moment, and only then ask why they often occur together.
EXCHANGE-RATE CRISES
In the 1990s, foreign exchange crises have disrupted exchange
markets in western Europe, eastern Europe, South Africa, Latin America,
and, of course, East Asia. These recent crises have sharpened debate over
two opposing views on the causes of crises. One claim is that otherwise
successful economies have been victims of greedy market operators,
usually foreign ones. This view is especially popular with government
ministers in the afﬂicted countries. The opposing view is that such crises
are largely home-grown, and that the global capital market is simply
performing a needed role in disciplining imprudent government policies.
Early modern analytical thinking on exchange-rate crises, starting
with Krugman’s (1979) seminal article, tended to support the latter view.
In Krugman’s story, a government with a ﬁnite stock of foreign exchange
reserves is simultaneously pegging the exchange rate and following an
expansive ﬁscal policy inconsistent with the indeﬁnite maintenance of the
peg. Because the ﬁscal expenditures are ﬁnanced by running down
foreign reserves, an eventual currency collapse is inevitable. Krugman
elegantly showed how that collapse would occur on a uniquely deﬁned
date, as the result of a sudden speculative attack that forces the author-
ities to relinquish the currency peg even though their reserves are
positive beforehand. In this story, speculators are merely acting as they
must to prevent the emergence of excess proﬁt opportunities.
Recent thinking on crises would argue that this theory is not
universally correct, although it does not support the idea, either, that
currency crises can occur any time market whims dictate one. Instead,
there may be extensive “grey areas” in which unwise policies make
countries vulnerable to crises, but in which a crisis is not inevitable and
might in fact not occur without the impetus of international capital
outﬂows.
For example, a government with a large domestic-currency public
debt of short maturity may be induced to devalue by very high short-
term interest rates, which themselves reﬂect a rational expectation of
devaluation. The government’s motivation in devaluing is to debase its
debt in real terms so as to limit future tax burdens. On the other hand,
there can be a benign equilibrium in which markets do not expect
devaluation, interest rates are low, and the government’s pain therefore
is not so great as to induce a devaluation (Obstfeld 1994). A jump from
the second equilibrium to the ﬁrst—due to an essentially exogenous
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crisis that erupted in the late spring of 1998 ﬁts this model well, as does
the recent attack on Brazil’s currency.
This logic suggests that crises may contain a self-fulﬁlling element,
just as bank runs do, which can generate multiple equilibria in interna-
tional asset markets and render the timing of crises somewhat indeter-
minate. What we see in these cases is a sharp break from an essentially
tranquil equilibrium to a crisis state, rather than a gradual deterioration
in domestic interest rates and other market-based indicators. This view
helps explain why capital markets can appear to impose too little
discipline before the crisis arrives, and too harsh a discipline afterward.
CRISES OF NATIONAL SOLVENCY
Solvency crises, on the other hand, could occur even in a country that
uses the U.S. dollar as its currency; the exchange rate channel is not
central in theory, although it often has been in practice. If lenders refuse
to roll over a country’s maturing dollar debts, and if the country lacks the
liquid resources—foreign reserves and credit lines—with which to meet
its obligations, a crisis ensues. Here we have a pretty precise analogy with
the case of a banking panic, since willing rollover would preclude panic,
whereas a market fear that others will ﬂee makes it optimal for each
individual lender to ﬂee as well. In the 1980s debt crisis, much develop-
ing-country debt was incurred by sovereign governments or guaranteed
by them. In the 1990s, the borrowers have been private banks and
corporations, but governments have felt compelled to back up at least the
banks’ debts so as to avoid domestic ﬁnancial collapse. And government
credit support of banks has in some cases been on-lent to their corporate
customers so as to (temporarily) prop up the paper value of bank assets.
Thus, the earlier example of a government funding crisis largely applies.
Dı ￿az Alejandro (1985), describing Chile’s experience in the early 1980s,
gave a classic account of the nationalization of supposedly private foreign
debts.
HOW CURRENCY CRISES AND NATIONAL
SOLVENCY INTERACT
The European countries that devalued in the 1992 Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) currency crises did not subsequently fall into solvency
crises, which is why their forced devaluations did not impair growth
(indeed, may have helped it). In other cases, however, exchange rate and
solvency crises can interact in explosive ways. The attempt to assure ﬁxed
exchange rates (or a preannounced ceiling on exchange depreciation) can
lead to the very vulnerabilities that raise the possibility of an international
solvency crisis. When domestic banks and corporate borrowers are
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without adequately hedging against the risk that the domestic currency
will be devalued, sharply raising the ratio of their domestic-currency
liabilities to their assets. They may believe that even if a crisis occurs, the
government’s promise to peg the exchange rate represents an implicit
promise that they will be bailed out in one way or another. Borrowers
may face little risk of personal loss even if a bailout does not materialize,
because they have little capital of their own at stake.
This problem has been especially severe in developing countries,
where prudential regulation is looser, ﬁnancial institutions are weaker,
and even the government’s credit may be questionable. When market
sentiment turns against the exchange rate peg, the government is
effectively forced to assume the short foreign-currency positions in some
way—or else to allow a cascade of domestic bankruptcies. Since the
government at the same time has used its foreign exchange reserves (in a
vain attempt to peg the exchange rate), may have sold dollars extensively
in forward markets as Thailand did prior to ﬂoating the baht in July 1997,
and cannot borrow more in world credit markets, national default
becomes imminent.
What potential macro adjustments ratify the expectations of depre-
ciation that start the process rolling? It is essentially the threat that the
government budget, now burdened with higher public debts and the
debts of the private banking system, will be balanced through inﬂation. It
is of course true that currency depreciation is bankrupting the domestic
ﬁnancial system and the government might prefer an equilibrium in
which there is no depreciation and no inﬂation. But that is not the Nash
equilibrium that characterizes a crisis. Given market expectations of
depreciation, it still may be optimal for the government to inﬂate.1
Indonesia’s severe crisis illustrates these mechanisms at work. In
1997 Indonesia had come down from its spectacular economic perfor-
mance of earlier years, but still had a healthy rate of growth, a reasonable
real exchange rate, and a current account deﬁcit of manageable size. The
country had a short-term external debt of 182 percent of GDP; but the
ﬁgure had been nearly as large in 1995 (according to the Bank for
International Settlements) and the country had avoided a crisis then.
After the July 1997 Thai devaluation, however, the rupiah came under
pressure and was cut loose to ﬂoat.
Sharp depreciation in December 1997—part the result of increasingly
evident regional problems, part the result of domestic ﬁnancial panic
reinforced by policy uncertainties—led to a massive deterioration in
1 Of course, other mechanisms are driving such crises, as well. Because domestic
interest rates rise, entities that ﬁnance long-term domestic lending with short-term domestic
borrowing—for example, bank deposits—come under immediate pressure.
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collapsed. The government reacted by providing massive doses of
liquidity in December and January, fueling further depreciation and,
soon, sharply higher inﬂation (Figure 1). The new year also saw continu-
ing runs on domestic banks, with the currency/M2 ratio rising from 16.6
in December to 21.8 in January. In effect, the government was buying up
the private sector’s negative net worth and ﬁnancing the bailout through
inﬂationary money creation. Of course, the collapse of the ﬁnancial sector
and the cessation of capital inﬂows have been accompanied by collapses
in investment and in consumer durables purchases, and by difﬁculties for
the export sector, which relies on trade credits.
It is hard to maintain that the Indonesian crisis was inevitable. Other
of the regional crises, I would argue, also contain self-fulﬁlling elements
to greater or lesser degrees. Hong Kong’s ongoing problems offer a case
in point. How can an economy as open as Hong Kong’s gain economi-
cally from devaluing? Yet speculation has continued through 1998 and
political support for maintaining the link to the U.S. dollar could erode in
the face of rising unemployment.
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How should monetary and ﬁscal policies be managed in the current
crisis? The stakes are extraordinarily high, but the easy answers are few—
in effect, policy must counteract the severe capital-account shocks by
creating a new expectational climate, and economics has little to say as to
how this can be done short of infeasibly extensive ofﬁcial ﬁnancial
support from abroad. Fiscal expansion would seem to carry minimal
risks, given the generally sound public ﬁnances of these countries in the
past. It is especially needed in Japan, where a negative ﬁscal shock in 1997
has helped propel the economy downward. Japanese monetary expan-
sion risks further yen depreciation and adverse competitive effects
elsewhere in the region. But it would still give a welcome boost to world
demand and might marginally help those who have borrowed in yen.
The optimal response by Japan would be a policy mix of monetary and
ﬁscal expansion with offsetting exchange rate effects.
Given the dollar and yen debts incurred in other Asian countries,
monetary expansion by them risks throwing gasoline on the ﬁre. How-
ever, it is unlikely that tight money policies alone will restore conﬁdence
in regional currencies until Japan, seemingly suffering from policy
paralysis, gets its house in order. Moreover, the Federal Reserve and the
new European Central Bank have an extraordinary power to worsen the
situation by raising interest rates in pursuit of domestic inﬂation objec-
tives. To do so now would be an error of perhaps historic proportions.
The Fed, at least, seems to have recognized the danger.
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